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FOREWORD
The age old question of man's innate predisposition has 
been pondered for hundreds of years. Many approaches have been 
introduced in an effort to decipher such questions as whether 
man is naturally cooperative or competitive, and if man has 
innate tendencies towards aggressive, or other forms of 
behavior. Such great political philosophers as Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel have all put forth different theories 
exploring the "archetypical” problems that will be approached 
here through an sociobiological paradigm.’ The roots of 
political behavior do not go back thousands of years to the 
beginning of civilized society, but actually stretch back 
millions of years to the beginning of evolution. Such an 
evolutionary paradigm, better known as "sociobiology," can help 
build bridges between the natural and social sciences, and 
eventually lead to a better understanding of how man's innate 
behavior is related to the social institutions which have 
developed.
In 1976 Somit identified four primary components of 
"biopolitics" that are still relevant today and will be touched 
on throughout this paper:
(1 ) general considerations for a biologically oriented 
political science;
iii
(2 ) an evolutionary approach to the study of political 
behavior, with insights obtained from ethology;
(3) physiological aspects of political behavior;
(4) public policy ramifications of the interface between 
biological sciences and political science. 2
t
These components are very broad in scope and represent the 
large diversity of areas a sociobiological approach can 
encompass. Such an approach could have far reaching impli­
cations on future policy decisions.
A sociobiological paradigm could lead to a better under­
standing of many of the problems that face today's society. An 
evolutionary approach could help provide a more accurate 
conception of the constitution as it relates to mans biological 
needs. Insight may be gained on the reasons for conventional 
war, and the nuclear arms race which threatens the very 
survival of the human species. A better comprehension of man's 
innate needs could lead to answers on the appropriate form of 
government. For example, in the Twentieth Century many violent 
conflicts have occurred between proponents of communism and 
those who believe in capitalism and the free-market system. 
Some people have even gone so far as to say one form of 
government is naturally or innately better than others. These 
same people might say man has "evolved" to favor one form of 
government over others. By taking a biological and evolution­
ary approach, and examining man's evolved behaviors, can one 
determine if a certain form of government is most appropriate 
to human needs? Can one use the knowledge an evolutionary 
approach would provide to help solve some of the major problems
iv
facing society today? The purpose of this paper is to examine 
these questions; and hopefully, through analysis understand 
man's needs and the appropriate policy decisions that would 
fulfill these needs and help lead to appropriate solutions.
v
PART I
A SOCIOBIOLOGICAL PARADIGM - THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
"If legal institutions and governments are not merely 
man-made conventions or arbitrary manifestations of human will 
(Plato, "Republic", IV. 428a-444e [cited by Masters)), it 
behooves us to follow the Socratic tradition of seeking 
standards of that which is right or just, according to 
nature. ' " 1 In other words, it would pay to keep asking 
questions to work toward a true understanding of man's human 
nature and genetic make-up in order to make appropriate policy 
decisions. "Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of 
the biological basis of all social behavior. " 4 By applying 
sociobiology and a biological perspective towards politics and 
economics, a greater understanding of mans behavior and needs 
can be attained.
The sociobiological approach relies on the theor;’es of 
evolution put forth by Charles Darwin, and also utilizes modern 
genetics going back to the discoveries of Gregor Mendel. 
Therefore, it is imperative that one has a proper understanding 
of Darwin's theory of evolution. In brief, Darwin believed 
that the struggle for existence is a preproductive test of 
fitness, which begins at birth. Individuals possessing slight 
favorable variations would tend to survive, achieve success in
1
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the intense sexual competition, and pass traits on through 
their offspring. New behaviors, organs, and species would 
eventually evolve through the inheritance of favorable varia­
tions. * Just as one must have an adequate understanding of 
evolutionary theory, one must also be careful not to mis­
construe an evolutionary approach as a call for eugenics, or an 
argument for determinism. To the contrary, the purpose of 
sociobiology is to provide greater freedom, stemming from a 
stronger knowledge of the cause and effect patterns that 
underlie our very nature and history.*
A biological perspective simply means using the Darwinian 
theory of evolution and natural selection. By natural selec­
tion I mean the evolutionary adaptive strategies applied in 
reproductive competition and genetic selection. Genetic 
selection is defined as "the change in relative frequency in 
genotypes due to differences in the ability of their phenotypes 
to obtain representation in  the next generation."’ Any 
organism is constantly striving to further its genes in the 
next generation and the degree to which they succeed can be 
called their genetic or inclusive fitness. Therefore, it would 
be expected that organisms tend to evolve behavior that allows 
inclusive fitness to be maximized. This means humans (and 
other animals) presumably have enduring traits which were 
genetically selected as life evolved over millions of years. 
From this perspective it is not hard to understand why self- 
interest has high survival value even though the evolutionary
3
process occurred in different places under very different 
circumstances. 8 By understanding these traits which have 
evolved and applying the concept of genetic fitness one can 
better ascertain the type of government and policies needed in 
today's world.
PART II
NATURAL vs. POLITICAL
In essence, what is being asked is: what system of 
government and policies are more "natural” for human beings? To 
answer this question one must compare what can be called the 
natural economy and natural law versus the political economy 
and political law. 9 The political economy uses laws to limit 
the natural competition between men. The natural economy has 
no such outside forces and is limited only by the forces (or 
"laws") of nature. There must be a certain degree of harmony 
h-.tween the political and natural economy if the system in 
question is to work. However, political economy institutions 
can provide two types o f  advantages. First, the political law 
and government may d i s c o u r a g e  and limit the amount of internal 
fighting; and therefore, prevent I0 3 -  o f  strength that would be 
harmful to the group as a whole. The political law also allows 
individuals to spend less time patrolling and monitoring for 
"cheaters.” Secondly, the political economy allows for more 
sophisticated dealings in the form of contracts and mutually 
beneficial reciprocal relationships. However, the institutions 
of political economy, and the laws that go with it, can never 
be so perfect as to completely take the place of the underlying 
natural economy which dictates man's actions.1r Therefore, one
4
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must ask to what extent the ’living” 11 constitution is actually 
a manifestation of innate human behavior relying on biological 
predispositions (as will be discussed later in the paper)?
There does appear to be elements of social man and human 
nature which support certain forms of political law more than 
others. However, different forms of political law may be 
supported to a varying degree depending on the context and 
different social environments. If the appropriate political 
laws are applied to coincide with the prevailing natural laws, 
then the natural law will be able to serve as a substitute for 
coercive law. 12 The question which now remains is: what are 
the biological traits which make-up the natural economy and 
law? I will discuss several traits, and attempt to explore 
some of man's basic needs which may be relevant in trying to 
apply a biological perspective toward discovering the true 
natural economy and law that exists.
UNDERSTANDING MAN'S BASIC NEEDS
One of the important questions a biological perspective 
can help answer is to determine what are man's biological 
needs. In order to understand man as a political animal, one 
must first understand the basic biological drives and needs 
which cause a particular set of actions on the part of an 
individual. As defined by Peter Corning, I use ’the term need
6
in the biological sense of a requisite for the continued 
functioning of an organism in a given environmental context; 
that is, denial of the posited need would significantly reduce 
the organism's ability to function and/or reduce the statis­
tical probability of its continued survival and successful 
reproduction. ” 13 Corning also distinguished between those 
needs that must be satisfied for: merely sustaining life, 
minimal ability to reproduce and nurture young, and optimal 
ability to survive efficiently and reproduce to the maximum 
extent.
Needs such as those that are necessary for survival, 
certain physical/chemical requirements, and particular types of 
sensory stimulation immediately come to mind. But it is often 
hard to distinguish between what any one individual simply 
wants, and what that person actually needs. There may also be 
a gap between actual biological needs, and those needs defined 
by the culture in which that person lives. However, it is a 
biological perspective which can demonstrate how the satis­
faction of basic human needs can affect political behavior.
Measuring survival needs in the biological, ecological, 
and cultural spheres is very much within the realm of bio- 
politics. Determining whether basic survival needs are being 
met could affect present and future policy decisions. Corning 
calls for three interrelated modes of analysis:
1. A form of 'social indicators' oriented to measuring how 
basic survival needs are being met (these we are 
calling "survival indicators”);
7
2 . 'Forecasts,' or rigorously disciplined speculations, 
about probable trends and future problems in basic, 
survival-related social processes;
3. Holistic, or whole 'systems analyses (some of which 
would also involve forecasting) focused on the basic 
interactions between human populations and their 
environments, resource bases and technologies. 14
Therefore, a sociobiological perspective which demonstrates
man's basic needs would help provide minimal objectives against
which current policies could be evaluated, and future policies
could be formulated.
PART III
ETHOLOGY AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR_: JS_THERE._A RELATION?
Many people have advocated the use of ethology for 
discovering important aspects of human behavior that have been 
genetically transmitted throughout evolution. Specific modes 
or responses which shape the manner in which a species conduct 
the functions essential to its survival have been developed 
over millions of years, and genetically transferred from 
generation to generation. The extent to which these innate 
patterns influence behavior vary in degree, being most con­
trolling among the lowest forms of life, and allowing greater 
flexibility of response as one moves up the evolutionary ladder 
towards human beings.1* Ira Carmen has even contended that 
hominids have inherited a biosocial predisposition to formulate 
third party solutions to dyadic conflicts, resulting in the 
establishment of rules transcending their own interests. He 
also maintains that humans are predisposed toward ethnocentrism 
and armed conflict against ’outsiders,” but have a counter- 
posing predisposition against genocide.1* In both primates and 
non-primates alike, genetic predispositions seem to play an 
important role in the behavior of all organisms.
However, genetic predispositions do not mean that man, or 
any other animal, is completely "genetically programmed" to
8
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respond the same way to similar stimuli. The concept of an 
instinct is not solely hereditary in nature; but, can also be 
largely influenced by learning, especially among humans. Such 
fields as psychopharmacology have gone a long way towards 
establishing the ethologists claims that there is a direct 
connection between behavior in man and other forms of life, and 
biology. 17 Therefore, ethology should be used as part of a 
sociobiological perspective to the extent that it can shed 
light on some of the innate predispositions that influence 
behavior.
PART IV
COOPERATION vs, CONFLICT
One of the primary questions facing the sociobiologist is 
whether man has an innate tendency towards cooperation or 
conflict When analyzing the question a biological perspective 
must be applied. The innate tendency will be the one which is 
the most evolutionary adaptive strategy. In other words, one 
must always apply the doctrine that an organism is constantly 
trying to further its genes. It then follows that the innate 
social behavior which has evolved in humans is the behavior 
which is the most adaptive strategy and the one most likely to 
further a particular individual's genes.
Applying a biological perspective one can deduct that 
reproductive competition is the first imperative of nature. 
Furthermore, all means of struggle will be utilized in this 
competition as long as one contender or the other finds it to 
their advantage. The evolutionary approach suggests that 
self-interest is the ultimate motivation of all life, including 
human. 18 In choosing an economic and governmental form of 
organization, one must interpret the economic system as an 
adaptive mechanism which chooses among exploratory actions 
generated by the adaptive pursuit of genetic or inclusive 
fitness. 19 From the above conclusion that self interest is
10
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manifested in furthering one's genes, one would probably 
conclude that conflict is the natural tendency of all animals. 
Although self-interest and the furthering of one s genes is the 
primary motivator of all life, this does not mean that conflict 
is the best way to achieve these selfish goals. If conflict 
was the only viable adaptive strategy, then the altruism 
present in today's society would not exist.
As Ronald Wintrobe said, "It pays to do good, but not to 
do more good than it pays: A note on the survival of al­
truism. "ao In other words, one must always keep in mind that 
man is essentially selfish, and any behavior that evolves (even 
altruism) will in the long run benefit that individual's 
inclusive fitness. From this perspective one can gather that 
organisms have found it advantageous to come together in 
patterns of cooperative association. But such cooperation is 
only a secondary instinct and is contingent upon two other 
points. First, the cooperation that evolves i3 only a means 
for more effectively competing against outsiders. The second 
main point is that, even within the group, not all strategies 
and interests will be compatible; hence, cooperation must 
generally be facilitated by sanctions. Cooperative behavior is 
enforced by moralistic aggression on the part of the third 
parties that may stem from the envy complex. As Jack Hirsh- 
leifer put it:
At every point in time each decision-making agent will be 
weighing the relative attractiveness of cooperation and 
conflict strategies -- of seeking mutual advantage on the
12
one hand, on the other hand unilateral advantage even at 
the expense of others. And indeed, the latter is the more 
fundamental evolutionary force; ultimately, cooperative 
association is only a means for more effectively competing 
against others in the struggle for reproductive survival.2'
It then follows that altruistic and non-altruistic acts will 
coexist and the degree of altruism in any given culture will 
vary greatly. Natural selection would not result in a society 
of pure altruism, but would evolve into a mix of altruistic and 
non-altruistic genes. 22 This means that at any moment: the 
individual is balancing cooperative strategies (voluntary 
exchange with others) and conflictual strategies (aggression to 
take from others). The tendency which will win out depends on 
the context of the situation and the surrounding forces of the 
environment.
Several aspects mentioned in the above discussion of 
cooperative versus conflictual behavior need to be further 
examined in order to better understand man's innate tendencies, 
and why such social behavior cannot necessarily he examined as 
a constant social trait. The ensuing analysis will help 
clarify why man acts, or appears to act, in a cooperative 
manner at certain times, and not at others. Aspects that will 
be discussed include: altruism, reciprocity, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, the problem of cheaters, aggression, and individual 
versus group selection.
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ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY
The fact is that forms of altruism and cooperation do 
exist. Therefore, taking the biological perspective, these 
forms of altruism and cooperation must somehow be evolutionary 
adaptive strategies. The definition of altruism in socio­
biology is: "When a person (or animal) increases the fitness of 
another at the expense of his own fitness, he can be said to 
have performed an act of altruism."2' Altruism is most 
noticeable among organisms that have tics of kinship. Altruism 
toward kin is one of the enduring traits of human nature 
because of the common genes that exist between relatives. When 
altruism occurs between parents and offspring, or b ;ween 
siblings, the altruist is actually increasing his own fitness 
because the altruist is ensuring the futthering of some of his 
own genes. For example, idealistically speaking, altruism 
toward two siblings would be equivalent to that toward eight 
cousins, because the altruist is furthering the same amount of 
common genes. Therefore, when a person performs an act of 
altruism, it is not necessarily at the expense of his own 
fitness.
However, altruism does not just occur between kin; but can 
also be extended to non-kin relationships. There are several 
sources of altruism; and hence, cooperation between persons 
with no genetic relatedness. Reciprocal altruism is one 
adaptive strategy that has arisen and is a source of coop­
14
eration between humans. The ability to differentiate other 
individuals of the same species from each other has been 
crucial in the evolution of reciprocal altruism. Even without 
humans ability to recognize faces, reciprocity might have 
evolved successfully if another form of recognition came about. 
However, if humans did not have the ability of recognition it 
is quite possible that reciprocal behavior may have become 
extinct at a very early age, or never have come into existence 
at all. The extent to which the function of facial recognition 
has become specialized in humans is revealed by the brain 
disorder called prosopagnosia. Someone with this disorder is 
not able to recognize another person by their facial features 
alone. Some form of communication also seems to be important 
for effective reciprocal behavior to take place. Fred Kort has 
even ascertained that reciprocal behavior utilizes the right 
hemisphere of the brain for some of its manifestations, and 
resources of the left hemisphere for the rational aspects of 
reciprocal behavior. 24
Reciprocity can only be established as an adaptive 
strategy in a population if the appropriate conditions provide 
an advantage for altruists above that of selfish strategists.7 4 
If the conditions are not such as to provide an advantage for 
the altruist, then there would be no reason for reciprocity to 
evolve. Reciprocity is more likely to evolve when the costs 
ure low and the rewards are high. Reciprocal altruism is also 
very common among kin, and more likely to occur than altruism
15
with no expectations of return. Even among kin thj relation­
ship between any two people will vary according to the past 
history of exchanges.
The high intelligence, long memory, and communication 
capabilities of humans make the monitoring of others behavior 
and evaluation of exchange benefits an important part of 
reciprocal altruism. Humans gather information from third 
parties and rely on others reputations; as well as, the 
relative importance of future interactions. Reciprocal 
altruism may also take place because of the possibility of 
indirect reciprocity.2* For example, if individual "A" is 
altruistic towards individual "B," with the expectation that 
individual ”A" will at some later time benefit from a relative 
of "B," designated as individual "C.” It is not necessary that 
altruist "A" is rewarded by the direct beneficiary, just that 
the altuist's overall inclusive fitness is increased by the 
act. Many social institutions that have developed are char­
acterized by such forms of indirect exchange.
Analysis must allow one to conclude that altruism can be 
an evolutionary adaptive strategy. Therefore, in a natural 
economy, the fitness of an altruistic person could exceed that 
of the egoistic or selfish persons. One reason this may be 
true is because each person has an incentive to consider the 
effects of his behavior on others. If an individual is 
altruistic, then the individual who received the benefits will 
be discouraged from acting selfishly toward the altruist at a
16
later date. "Although an altruist forgoes some own fitness to 
raise the fitness of others, and so forth, h±s own fitness may 
exceed that of an equally able egoist because the beneficiaries 
of his altruism are discouraged from harming him."2*
When applying this to a population, one can conclude that 
even though many members may want to act selfishly and not 
cooperate, each has an incentive to consider the effects of his 
behavior on the others. Additionally, each person in the group 
who is linked by an altruist's transfer has an incentive to 
maximize the group's total income, even if most members are 
selfish or egoistical.2  ^ The paradox is that by benefitting 
others, they are actually benefitting themselves.
With regard to political behavior and policy implemen­
tation one should keep in mind such innate predispositions as 
reciprocal altruism. If one starts to feel to alienated in 
today's bureaucratic society, they may restrain altruistic acts 
toward the institution due to a feeling of loss of recognition. 
Kort maintains that studies, based on the specialization of the 
brain, to determine whether reciprocal behavior is uniform in 
man or has high diversity, could answer some important ques­
tions. He says that if such studies would show uniformity in 
reciprocal behavior, then differences in political structures 
could be attributed to different cultural developments in the 
way reciprocity was accommodated. But if the studies would 
show diversity in reciprocal altruism, then different political
17
systems could possibly be attributed to a different evolu­
tionary basis of reciprocal behavior. 27
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
One useful tool in examining how cooperation can arise 
between non-kin is the ’Prisoner's Dilemma." The simple 
Prisoner's Dilemma game has two players with two choices each* 
either cooperate or defect. Defection renders a higher payoff 
than cooperation, no matter what the other play chooses. 
However, each player must make the choice without knowing what 
the other is going to do. The dilemma is that if both players 
defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated. The 
simplicity of the Prisoner's Dilemma makes it useful for 
identifying the subtle features of interaction that get easily 
overlooked in the complex reality of most situations. W.D. 
Hamilton introduced his version of the Prisoner's Dilemma with 
four proposed types of behavior, defined in cost-benefit terms 
as related to inclusive fitness. Figure I is a generalization 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma and helps explain how different forms 
of behavior can arise.
The figure analyzes social behavior in terms of each 
individuals' costs and benefits and assumes the individual will 
act in such a way as to maximize benefits. From a biological 
point of view the benefits are the proportion of an indi­
18
vidual's genes transmitted to future generations. "Nepotism," 
involves favoring close kin and ensures a large degree of 
payoff in terms of genetic fitness. On the other hand, "mutual 
benefits" or reciprocal altruism refers to situations in which 
two unrelated individuals benefit from each
FLGURE_I
HAMILTON'S "FOUR TYPES OF BEHAVIOR" 10
Gain
B
Loss
Gain Loss
Mutual
Benefit
Sociality
or
Virtue
Nepotism MutualHarm
others actions. As discussed, reciprocal altruism often 
depends on the ability of cognition that helps prevent non- 
cooperative "free riders" 11 or cheaters. "mutual harm” may 
occur when organisms gain more from denying themselves the use 
of a beneficial resource rather than taking the chance of 
rivals using the resource. When mutual harm becomes the most 
predominate action a species will tend to be asocial. The 
fourth category, "sociality” or "virtue," is a situation that
19
occurs when an animal seems to suffer a relative loss while 
potential competitors gain.
One should not make the mistake of believing that an 
organism* especially humans, rely on only one of these four 
types of behavior, ilumans are capable of using any and all of 
these behaviors during a single day. Furthermore, one must 
constantly be aware of the problem of cheating. A situation in 
which an individual is pretending to cooperate while actually 
engaging in nepotism or selfish behavior, which would have 
greater payoffs than reciprocal altruism, assuming the cheater 
does not get caught. 12 By applying this tool of analysis one 
can better understand how different social behaviors can come 
about.
Through analysis one can relate each of these categories 
more closely to human behavior, and the institutions that are 
effected by such behavior. For example, although mutual harm 
is rare among most animals, it is more common among humans due 
to their awareness of blood lines and ability to be more 
conniving. 33 Sociality or virtue presents a situation in which 
the altruist may not receive direct personal benefit; and 
therefore, relies on the mediation of the social group to 
ensure his kin will benefit. Sophisticated civilizations are 
characterized by such cooperation among millions of indi­
viduals, most of whom are unlikely to reciprocate in a personal 
or direct relationship. The establishment of government has 
allowed cooperative behavior in which the altruist does not
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have to necessarily rely on reciprocity between identifiable 
individuals. As Roger Masters puts it, "The establishment of 
formal government -i.e. what is conventionally called the 
'state- greatly reinforces the scope of such behavior by 
increasing both the costs of cheating' and the benefits of 
'virtues' like heroism in battle, charity, and obeying laws 
contrary to one's narrow self-interest (Campbell, 1972; 
Willhoite, 1901)."’4 He further asserts that behavior in which 
thousands or millions of people cooperate, or even sacrifice 
for the benefit of the group, can develop only under human's 
complex and technological social systems. However, this does 
not mean that the social order in such high level civilizations 
cannot break down and deteriorate.
THE PROBLEM OF CHEATERS
As previously mentioned, the cheater is an individual who 
does not reciprocate an altruistic act, or pretends to recipro­
cate while actually behaving selfishly. In order for selection 
to discriminate against cheaters, conditions must exist that 
make the overall cost of cheating outweigh the
benefits. The detrimental effects on the cheaters life must be 
greater than the benefits of not reciprocating. Therefore, the 
cheater would be selected against relative to individuals who 
reciprocate on a regular basis.
21
Elliott White has distinguished between two types of 
cheating. The first he calls ’gross cheating” and refers to 
the cheater who does not reciprocate at all, leaving the 
altruist to suffer the costs of his unreciprocated contri­
bution. The second type is called "subtle cheating” and refers
to those cheaters who reciprocate, but give less then received 
from the altruistic act. In this case, the altruist will still
benefit, but not to the degree he would have from a completely
equitable relationship. It is very difficult to detect some 
forms of cheating, particularly subtle, which can make such 
behavior adaptive under certain circumstances. It is likely a 
system would develop that allows an individual to benefit from 
altruistic exchanges, protect himself from different forms of 
cheating, and practice forms of cheating that the conditions 
allow. 5 * However, reciprocal cooperation can be stable in a 
large population as long as individual.3 have the ability of 
recognition, so as to prevent the defecting, or cheating, 
individual from blending in with the crowd. In humans this 
ability is well developed; and therefore, reciprocal coop­
eration can occur successfully. 1 *
22
AGGRESSION
The degree of inherent aggressiveness in humans has always 
been a basic question concerning the nature of man. One 
argument proposed by ethologists is that man h as  evolved from a 
predatory, carnivorous ancestor. As early man e v o l v e d ,  h u n t in g  
and killing were an important part of t h e i r  l i v e s  and such 
behavior became an important part of human n a t u r e . ’ ' Most 
theories of aggression have been centered around e i t h e r  the 
"biological instinctual," the "social learning theory," or t he  
"frustration-aggression" hypothesis. However, the most 
complete theory must not concentrate solely on any one model, 
but must combine aspects of all three of these theories. I t  
must also take into account the processes of biological 
evolution and the genetic origin of aggression.
Aggression is generally considered to be stimulus related 
and elicited by specific triggers in the environment. Recent 
evidence points to the fact that there is probably not just one 
kind of aggression, but several different categories. Moyer 
has introduced eight different categories of aggression: 
predatory, inter-male, fear-induced, irritable, territorial, 
maternal, instrumental, and sex related.''' Different type of 
stimuli will elicit the different types of aggression. A 
particular aggressive behavior stems from a combination of the 
individual's social and ecological environment, reacting with
23
the person's neurophysiological and biochemical mechanisms that 
are a product of evolution.
The widespread appearance of aggressive traits means that 
such behavior must have evolved as an evolutionary adaptive 
strategy. Therefore, aggressive behavior must have been 
favored by natural selection to the degree that the behavior 
improved the individuals chances for survival and reproduction. 
In this respect, social learning may be one aspect of aggres­
sive behavior, but the neural organization that allows aggres­
sive behavior to be triggered is genetic in origin.
The above discussion has referred primarily to individual 
aggression; however, a complete analysis of aggression cannot 
overlook the widespread phenomenon of group, or collective 
violence. Many variables may enter into the explanation of how 
collective violence or aggression arises. Nevertheless, the 
complexity of group behavior does not make an evolutionary and 
biological perspective any less useful. Such factors as 
reciprocal altruism, envy, and territoriality may all be 
involved in group aggression. For example, group aggression 
will be favored where each individual is vulnerable if alone, 
but protected by cooperation that could lead to collective 
group aggression. 39 The job of the sociobiologist is to 
determine the environmental cues that trigger the individual or 
collective violence, as a result of a species-specific heredi­
tary trait.
24
INDIVIDUAL SELECTION vs. GROUP SELECTION
Among the important questions that Darwin's theory of 
evolution leaves ambiguous is whether natural selection occurs 
at the individual or group level. Natural s e l e c t i o n  at the  
group level would imply that competition between groups, o f  the  
same species, would ensure the survival o f  th e  b e t t e r  adapted 
group in the long run. But if there is no regard f o r  the 
effect on the species as a whole, and the gene solely a c t s  to 
favor its own survival, then nature operates at the individual 
level of selection. This individual level of selection was put 
forth in the "selfish gene" theory, as expressed by Dawkins, 
"There is really only one entity whose point of view matters in 
evolution, and that entity is the selfish gene. " 40
Natural selection does occur at the level of the indi­
vidual; however, this does not mean groups have been unim­
portant in the process of evolution. As discussed earlier, the 
cooperative efforts of a group can often work to the benefit of 
each individual in that group. The synergistic effects of the 
group may have helped to protect particular individuals; 
therefore, aiding in the process of individual selection. G. 
C. Williams has reinterpreted many of the examples put forth as 
evidence for group selection, they are explained by Peter 
Corning as:
(a) fortuitous effects rather than adaptations "designed" 
by natural selection;
(b) the result of physically inevitable effects;
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(c) functional design that can be explained satisfactorily 
in terms of individual or kin selection;
(d) accidents,' that is, misplaced altruism originally 
designed to favor offspring but which has spilled over 
to benefit unrelated individuals; or
(e) statistical artifacts - summations of many indivi 
dually advantageous behaviors. 41
Hence, one may benefit from the effects of a cooperative group,
but it is at the individual level that natural selection
occurs.
PART V
INNATE REGULATORS
In following a sociobiological perspective one must try to 
deduce the genetic predispositions that effect political 
behavior. Part of these predispositions are innate regulators 
that might inhibit, or promote, a particular type of behavior 
depending on the situation. These emotional regulators have 
evolved over millions of years and play a part in determining 
social interactions. Some of these innate regulators would 
include "envy," behavior associated with dominance-deference 
hierarchies, feelings of territoriality, and the physiological 
and genetically produced chemicals effecting behavior.
The innate regulators that have evolved still maintain 
some of the traits of our early ancestors. By analyzing the 
human brain from an evolutionary standpoint Paul MacLean has 
been able to identify anatomical and chemical features of the 
brain that reflect an ancestral relationship to reptiles, early 
mammals, and late mammals. Through analysis of lizards MacLean 
has been able to isolate over twenty-five forms of behavior 
that are reflected in similar human characteristics. He has 
identified humans as possessing a triune brain: the inner most 
formation being designated as the "reptilian," surrounded by 
the "paleomammallan" (limbic system), with the outer most
26
27
portion called the "neomammalian." Histochemistry has allowed 
recent research to identify corresponding parts in reptiles, 
birds, monkeys, and humans.41 Much of human behavior, includ­
ing the innate regulators being discussed, can be traced to 
these early ancestors through the evolution of the triune 
brain. Some of these behaviors might include the activation of 
the challenge display in aggression, territoriality, and even 
the deep seated respect humans carry for precedent in legal and 
other matters.45
ENVY
"Envy” seems to be one emotional regulator that has evolved
and plays a part in determining social interactions. Envy may
function as an emotional reaction regulating reciprocal
relationships involving whatever people might value. It may be
a very strong and aggressive emotion that stems from the desire
to acquire something that someone else already possesses. Envy
may even occur between parent and offspring, as well as between
siblings, because the adaptive strategies each may employ are
not necessarily compatible. The emotional regulator may act as
a very pervasive form of social control in our environment.
*
One's motive to conform to established social norms might 
even be fear of arousing the aggressive envy of others. The 
emotion may also play a vital role in protecting against
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cheaters, due to the fact that people will be envious of those 
who get away with cheating, and. will, therefore, try to prevent 
it from happening. A strong feeling of envy may even trigger 
verbal or physical violence that appears to be an overreaction 
to the offense committed. “But since small inequities repeated 
many times over a lifetime may exact a heavy toll in relative 
fitness, selection may favor a strong show of aggression when 
the cheating tendency is discovered.”44 In an effort to 
control this envy, almost all cultures incorporate some type of 
symbolic and institutional devices for mitigating the fear it 
imposes. It seems envy, as an innate characteristic, plays a 
large role in regulating the social interactions of humans.4'
DOMINANCE - DEFERENCE HIERARCHIES
No matter what the ideological basis, almost all political 
structures are characterized to a certain extent uy a domi­
nance-deference hierarchy. The concepts of authority and
submission are very deeply ingrained in modern society. The 
advantages to the possessor of authority can easily be seen in 
their greater access to the necessities for survival and 
reproduction. Nevertheless, dominance orders can also be 
beneficial to those without authority by ensuring equality in 
social relations. In today's complex, industrial society the 
relationship between dominance and advantages in natural
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selection may become a little more ambiguous, but that does not 
mean the advantages do not exist.
Dominance-deference hierarchies are evolutionary in 
origin, and have arisen through the positive function played in 
the development of society. The traits of dominance and 
submission that are necessary for a hierarchial system can be 
thought of as adaptive predispositions. These same pre­
dispositions can be seen among many animals, as exemplified by 
the subordinate baboon presenting his rump to the dominant male 
as a sign of submission. The predispositions are adaptive to 
the degree that they help order activity and economic compe­
tition with a minimum of destructive conflict. Such hier­
archies can perform service and control functions that work for 
the benefit of the entire group. A breakdown of the hier­
archial organized system might allow the possibility of 
aggression to become more prevalent. The dominance relation­
ship may in some ways be conflictual; but, on an overall basis, 
if the hierarchy is stable and well ordered it will work to 
eliminate conflict:. Therefore, the dominance order seems to be 
held together by a combination of consensus and coercion.4*
Applying a sociobiological perspective can be very helpful 
in examining questions regarding the structure of society. 
Willhoite suggests that the stability of dominance-deference 
hierarchies depends on the extent to which the system accommo­
dates expectations of reciprocity. If the expectations are not 
met adequately the hierarchy may deteriorate, until a revo­
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lution replaces the old system with a new dominance-deference 
hierarchial structure. Willhoite has even argued that hopes 
for a classless society, with vanishing authority, is not 
compatible with an evolutionary persi eMive of behavior.47 
However, I would like to end this section with a note of 
caution about dominance-deference hierarchies and socio- 
biologica1 theory. Although there does appear to be innate 
predispositions towards such hierarchies; this does not imply 
that any one person, or group of people, is necessarily 
innately better than others, and has a '’right" to be in a 
position of dominant authority.
TERRITORIALITY
Territoriality as a universal trait among humans, and most 
other animals, appears o be another innaf*a regulator influenc 
m g  people's political behavlor Territorial behavior would
refer to a need ’r personal space,” and may be manifested 
through a deep attachment to a particular place, piece of land, 
village, or today even "patriotism," or "nationalism." it may 
encompass a particular domain, including a home site, an 
activity range, and a moving social space off limits to other 
animals. The concept of territoriality has been very closely 
associated with the power one possesses. Protection of 
territory has represented a gpace for self-preservation and
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p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p e c i e s  f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  o r g a n i s m .4 * 
Sym bols  a r e  o f t e n  u s e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  the  power  and t e r r i t o r ­
i a l i t y .
As J o s e p h  L o p r e a t o  pu t  it. ,  " . . , tpj  i i t n r d a l i t y  a s  a 
p r e d i s p o s i t i o n  may be d e f i n e d  as  a g e n e t i c a l l y  b a s e d  t e n d e n c y  
to  a c q u i r e  and d e f e n d  s p a c e  c o n t a i n i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  d i r e c t l y  
o r  i n d i r e c t l y  enhance  f i t n e s s ."'0 T h e r e f o r e ,  a n i m a l s  h a v e  a 
t e n d e n c y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a s p a c e  t h a t  i s  sm a l l  enough to p r o t e c t ,  
b u t  l a r g e  enough to  p r o v i d e  f o r  s u s t e n a n c e .  However ,  the  
d e g r e e  to  whic h  an a n i m a l  i s  t e r r i t o r i a l  w i l l  depend on 
s u r r o u n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  the  e n v i r o n m e n t .  For  e x a m p l e ,  
p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e s  would  c a u s e  an a n i m a l ' s  i n n a t e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s  to be m a n i f e s t e d  to  a g r e a t e r  e x t e n t .  T e r r i  
t o r i a l i t y  i s  b e n e f i c i a l  when the  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  f o r  such 
b e h a v i o r  a r e  l e s s  than the  b e n e f i t s  g a i n e d .  In o ther  w o r d s ,  
when t h e  e n e r g y  exp en de d  f o r  t ^ r i i t o i a l  b e h a v i o r  p r o v i d e s  a 
memmum o f  f  . t r r e s s  t h a t  would  not  o t h e r w i s e  x c u r .
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l i t y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
h i e r a r c h y ,  a d d s  o r d e r  to  an o t h e r w i s e  c o n f l i c t u a l  s y s t e m ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e ,  h e l p s  r e d u c e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  compe­
t i t i o n  f o r  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s 1 Humans a r e  t e r r i t o r i a l  on 
a l m o s t  e v e r y  i e v e l  o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n :  t h e  a t t a c h m e n t  o f  a 
f a m i l y  t o  i t s  home, t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  a town o r  c o u n t r y ,  and 
p e r h a p s  t o d a y  e ve n  the  t e r r i t o r y  o f  o u t e r  s p a c e .  P e o p l e  a l s o  
e s t a b l i s h  dom ain s  o f  t e r r i t o r y  in  c l u b s ,  s c h o o l s ,  b u s i n e s s e s ,  
and e v e n  f r i e n d s h i p s .  T e r r i t o r i a l i t y  as  an i n n a t e  r e g u l a t o r  i s
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a very pervasive predisposition in influencing humane political 
behavior. A better understanding of this behavior through a 
sociobiological framework could only lead to more appropriate 
policy decisions, and help answer questions about the viability 
of such propositions as a political and economic system 
advocating the abolition of private property.
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL BASIS OF SOCIOBIOLOGY
Many of the innate regulators described can almost be 
looked at as rules prescribing the parameters of behavior. 
However, why does a person tend to manifest a particular innate 
predisposition to a greater extent at one tip* than at another? 
Perhaps there is an internal reward system that induces 
particular predispositions ao triggered }y the environment. 
Bartley Hoebel has suggested that endogenous opiates within the 
brain may serve ao a reward system, and p r o v i d e  satisfaction 
for many different activities; including the satisfaction of 
eating, drinking, aggression, mating, d e f e n s e ,  altruism, and 
law abiding behavior. It seems an animal r genetic codes may 
produce chemicals that influence the animal s physiology and 
reinforce certain innate behavior patterns. In other words, 
"...the genetic code for manufacturing various 
drive-controlling chemicals is in some sens* rhe animal'8 code
of behavior.”81
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Throughout the evolutionary process certain models of 
behavior that proved to be adaptive became genetically in­
grained through reenforcement by endogenous chemical rewards. 
These drive controlling chemicals help ensure people adhere to 
the "laws” that have developed as an outgrowth of accepted 
behaviors. Some of these laws may simply be cultural, or 
actually biological, norms; while others may be the actual 
written law of the land. Pleasure or reward comes about when 
the individual matches behavior patterns to the internal 
expectations and models of behavior. therefore releasing 
opiates.*1
James Danielli has proposed that altruistic behavior in 
humans is partially due to an internal reward system, activated 
by prior social conditioning. Evolutionary mechanisms allow 
conditioning in youth, so that when an individual performs 
altruistic acts an internal reward system is activated. The 
mechanisms then release mood-controlling substances in the 
brain, and other places in the body.*4 There has also been 
work done on animals, in which certain chemicals have been 
induced or blocked, which provide evidence of their effect on 
at least basic behavior patterns.** Humans are motivated by 
emotions and internal regulators when deciding whether or not 
to obey the law. Assuming legal behavior aids in one's sur­
vival, any internal mechanism which promotes appropriate 
behavior, or a "sense of justice," is adaptive.**
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The internal reward system may also play a role in 
preserving the existing social structure by providing the 
law-abiding citizen with pleasure* through chemicals released 
in the body. Reciprocity, which in many ways is a precursor of 
the contract in modern society, is also promoted when an 
individual is provided with a sense of well being, by acting in 
accordance with both innate and learned rules. However, the 
mechanisms of an internal reward system do not necessarily mean 
the perpetuation of the status quo, since any number of 
different ideologies and goals could trigger the same response 
and result in feelings of pleasure/7 The job of the socio­
biologist is to discover neural, social, and evolutionary 
principles that effect peoples relationships as they respond to 
changes in the environment. However, the presence of an 
internal reward system does not mean people cannot choose 
different stimuli to achieve the same feelings, or that they 
cannot choose to completely refrain from certain behaviors that 
would activate the reward system. A better understanding of 
the genetically produced chemicals can be used for the benefit 
of society, but in no way implies that society should start 
using such knowledge for artificial means to achieve a desired 
behavior, or impose conformity.
PART VI
MAN AS A RATIONAL ANIMAL
At this point a distinction must be made between man and 
all other animals. For it is only man that is a truly rational 
animal and has the ability and developed intelligence to make 
rational decisions. The survival of most species depends on 
their evolutionary adaptive behavior, there is nothing to 
suggest that individual members of a species "calculate" their 
behavior in the same way as man. Most animals only respond in 
a conditioned manner; however, humans combine the adaptive 
strategies that have evolved with an ability to make a rational 
decision between different forms of behavior at different 
times. Humans are set apart by their ability to not only 
consider immediate needs, but also to consider future needs. 
Each individual is also capable of predicting how his actions 
will influence the reaction of others so as either to enhance 
or discourage future reciprocation.’* As discussed earlier, it 
appears that it would be beneficial for an individual to choose 
to be altruistic. But this will depend on the situation, and 
the proportion of altruists and egoists will vary from time to 
time and place to place.
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NATURE vs. NURTURE
The question at the root of many of the issues being
analyzed in this paper is the influence of nature versus that
of nurture. One who advocates solely the influence of nature
would believe that human behavior is entirely determined by
one's genetic and biological make-up. The nurture hypothesis
would imply that one behaves in a certain way only because they
are taught to behave that way. For human beings, as a rational
animal, the answer lays in neither of these extreme positions,
but somewhere in between. Actually, nature prescribes the
parameters and potential that is either fulfilled or not by the
affect of one's nurture. People have innate predispositions
that may, or may not, be maximized by their surroundings. As
the ethologist Niko Tinbergen stated:
The student of innate behavior, accustomed to studying a 
number of different species and the entire behavior 
pattern, is repeatedly confronted with the fact that an 
animal may learn some things much more readily than 
others....Different species are [furthermore) predisposed 
to learn different parts of the pattern. So far as we know 
these differences between species have adaptive signif­
icance.* *
Therefore, separating innate from learned behavior may be 
useful for trying to better understand the motive and origin of 
different behavior; but not for completely understanding man's 
overall behavior.
The ability of man to learn makes humans free from a 
biological determinism, and provides the impression that man
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has a totally free will. To an extent man does have a free 
will, but only to choose between preexisting dispositions that 
set the limits of behavior. The mind is a complex organization 
of neurons determined by a person's genetic "blueprint." The 
innate predispositions are not exact patterns for behavior, but 
set the parameters of general behavior between which people 
have to choose. Therefore, people may choose to respond to 
changes in the environment in different ways. Jean Piaget, a
genetic epistemologist, even showed that individuals follow 
predictable stages of development in which the interaction of 
heredity and environment are manifested in a particular way.*0 
The influence of learning, or nurture, in behavior, does 
not negate the important job of the sociobioloqist to discover 
more accurately the pervasive influence of innate predis­
positions. Even though humans have a distinct and exceptional 
ability for rational thought, one should not mistake all 
"preferences" or "tastes" for purely being the whims of an 
individual's imagination. The emphasis on all of these 
preferences towards self-interest, altruism, or social distinc­
tion, may largely be explained by the selection over time of 
traits having greater survival value. The sociobiologist can 
also learn much from observing the instincts, and in some cases 
partially learned, behavior of many animals. The fact that 
animals other than man cannot make rational and calculated 
decisions does not mean ethology cannot shed light on some of 
the innate predispositions effecting man's behavior. It should
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be noted that learning itself is an evolutionary adaptive 
strategy; and that it is the interaction between nature and 
nurture* biology and culture, that determines one's behavior. 
The relationship between rational choice and biologically 
innate traits suggest that:
...if genetical natural selection and rational behavior 
reinforce each other in producing speedier and more 
efficient responses to changes in the environment, perhaps 
that common preference function has evolved over time by 
natural selection and rational choice as that preference 
function best adopted to human society.* 1
In other words, humans make rational choices between the
already existing adaptive strategies which have evolved.
GENE - CULTURE COEVOLUTION
The behavioral choices that people make can also have an 
effect on the future adaptive strategies that will exist. 
Lumsden and Wilson set forth a theory of coevolution whereby 
the genes and culture evolve mutually and effect one another. 
In this cyclical model (shown in Figure II), genes affect 
cultural evolution through the mind, and culture affects how 
genes evolve. The human mind has evolved certain epigenetic 
rules which tend to bias the individual toward certain choices 
and patterns of cognition over others. Epigenetic rules are 
defined as "...the genetically underwritten peripheral sensory 
filters, interneuron coding processes, and more centrally
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located cognitive procedures of perception, learning, and 
decision making."** Culturgens are the learned concepts that 
are passed on by the members of a society. The epigenetic 
rules affect the existing cultergens and vice-versa, and each
FIGURE II
GENE - CULTURE COEVOLUTION
Genetic
Rules
coevolve subject to natural selection with every passage of the 
life cycle.*5 Therefore, the rdaptive strategies used are 
constantly evolving; and hence, mans social behavior is also 
constantly evolving and subject to change o .er time.
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Lumsden and Wilson have further added the "thousand year 
rule" to their theory of gene-culture coevolution. This rule 
maintains that significant evolution, resulting in the genetic 
assimilation of tendencies towards particular culturgens, can 
occur within one thousand years. In other words, the epi­
genetic rules of cultural transmission can go through consider­
able evolution within fifty generations. Therefore, inside a 
millennium, substantial genetic changes may occur which alter 
the parameters and innate predispositions of behavior.
PART VII
APPLYING A SOCIOBIOLOGICAL..PERSPECTIVE
The purpose of studying sociotiology is to gain a greater 
understanding of man as a political animal; and therefore, 
better understand the problems which confront today's society. 
The policy making implications of biopolitics is far reaching 
and could help lead to the solution of many controversial 
issues. The political process is strongly linked to survival 
imperatives, and the quest for power to obtain the maximum 
survival capabilities. However, different problems arise 
according to varying environmental and ecological conditions. 
A sociobiological perspective incorporating the problem of 
survival, and taking into account different environmental 
factors, can achieve promising growth towards sound policy 
making decisions.
Sociobiology could lead to such dramatic outcomes as the 
restructuring of political systems, to be more in line with 
man's natural predispositions. It could provide answers to 
ways to eliminate the violent aggression so prevalent in 
twentieth century civilization. At the very least sociobiology 
could improve the methods of obtaining accurate public opinion; 
and therefore, contribute to public policy formulation/4 
Sociobiology could help us distinguish accurately between what
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man w a n t s ,  and what  man a c c u a l l y  n e e d s .  An e v o l u t i o n a r y  
a p p r o a c h  e n c o m p a s s i n g  i n c l u s i v e  f i t n e s s  t h e o r y  c a n  p r o v i d e  the  
r e a s o n s  f o r  many c o n f l i c t s ,  and h o p e f u l l y  l e a d  to  many a n s w e r s .  
The r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  w i l l  be d e v o t e d  to  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  
o f  s e v e r a l  m a j o r  i s s u e s  from a s o c i o b i o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ;  and 
the  v i r t u e s  and d a n g e r s  o f  a p p l y i n g  su ch  a p e r s p e c t i v e .
COMMUNISM vs. CAP I TAM SM
T h e r e  i s  a l w a y s  g r e a t  d i s p u t e  o v e r  the  b e s t  t y p e  o f  
economic  and p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  un der  whic h  to  l i v e .  As s t a t e d  
a b o v e ,  a b i o l o g i c a l  a p p r o a c h  c o u l d  be o f  g r e a t  h e l p  i n  making 
a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s .  However ,  the  j o b  o f  a p p l y i n g  
s p e c i f i c  a d a p t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  which h av e  e v o l v e d  i n t o  g e n e t i c  
t r a i t s ,  to  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  i s  no t  so e a s y .  
Here we w i l l  t a k e  the  c a s e  o f  the  two most pr o m in en t  and h i g h l y  
d i s p u t e d  econ om ic  s y s t e m s :  communism v e r s u s  c a p i t a l i s m .  The
i n q u i r y  i s  w h e t h e r  the  b i o l o g i c a l  a p p r o a c h  c a n  ans wer  suc h 
g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n s  as  which  form o f  govern men t  i s  b e t t e r .  
F i r s t ,  a b r i e f  and g e n e r a l  ( n o t  to m ent io n i d e a l i s t i c )  d e f i ­
n i t i o n  o f  communism and c a p i t a l i s m  must be p r o v i d e d .
As d e f i n e d  i n  W e b s t e r ' s  T h i r d  New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D i c t i o n ­
a r y ,  communism i s :
A s y s t e m  o r  c o n d i t i o n  r e a l  o r  i m a g i n e d  i n  w h i c h  go od s  a r e  
owned commonly r a t h e r  t h a n  p r i v a t e l y  and a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a s  
n eed ed  to  e a c h  one i n  a u n i f i e d  g r o u p  so m e t i m e s  l i m i t e d ,
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sometimes inclusive, and often composed of members living 
and working together: a similar system preventing amassing
of privately owned goods and assuring equalitarian returns 
to those working.
This is a very general definition of communism and many people 
have different i eas on what communism truly means. Karl Marx 
also set forth the communist ideal: "from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs."
Just as there is dispute over a true definition of 
communism, there is also difference of opinion on an accurate 
definition of capitalism. However, Webster's defines capital 
ism as:
An economic system characterized by private or corporation 
ownership of capital goods, by investments that are
determined by private decision rather than by state
control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of 
goods that are determined mainly in a free market.
For further clarification, a free market can be construed as
any economic market operating by free competition. For the
purposes of this paper, these definitions of communism and
capitalism can serve as a basis for determining whether or not
a sociobiological perspective can help decide which is the
system best suiting mans genetic predisposition. The type of
government that corresponds closest with man's natural behavior
is the one that is the most evolutionary adaptive strategy.
In an attempt to answer the question I will briefly review 
different forms of government in a general sense. History has 
shown that completely open and unregulated economic freedom 
cannot persist. It has been unavoidable that governments
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become involved in redistributive activities to an increasing 
degree. It seems that people tend to place a high value on 
personal freedom, but also feel anxiety and guilt (possibly 
through the envy complex) when exploitation occurs. Therefore, 
the question is to what degree governments can be involved in 
redistributive activities without undermining peoples' value on 
personal freedom. The present day mixed economy, which 
attempts to be a compromise between the two, does not com­
pletely satisfy either the advocates of se1f interest-based 
competitio i or those who prefer a system of complete equality 
and social justice. Even those governments that do strive for 
total economic justice -- true reciprocal altruism -- have the 
dilemma of being hostile to personal freedom. There is also no 
evidence that these governments are economically less exploita­
tive than mixed economies or free markets associated with 
constitutional democracies.*1 As Hirshleifer put it, "...since 
political-economy institutions are always and necessarily 
imperfect, social co-operation rests to a degree upon founda­
tions that must remain viable even under natural economy."**
Sociobiology is not at this point prepared to make such a 
broad and sweeping statement as to say whether man is geneti­
cally predisposed towards either communism or capitalism. One 
cannot make the generalization of saying naturally cooperative 
behavior applies to communism, while naturally competitive 
behavior applies to capitalism. But sociobiology can try to 
analyze the genetic predispositions that should be taken into
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account when structuring a political or economic system. Some 
findings that would seem to favor a capitalist system are 
predispositions towards dominance-deference hierarchies and 
territoriality. Not to mention man's innate imperative to 
further his own genes. On the other hand, when examining a 
communist system one should keep in mind that cooperative 
strategies may only be a means towards more effective competi­
tion; and therefore, an evolutionary adaptive strategy. It is 
also likely that free-riders and cheating will be a problem in 
both systems. However, as pointed out earlier, different 
adaptive strategies can evolve according to different environ­
mental conditions. Even so, there would seem to be one type of 
economic and political system that is a universally more 
adaptive strategy. With further research towards discovering 
man's genetic predispositions which influence behavior, 
sociobiology could help determine the appropriate form of 
government.
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
Whether a society has a written constitution or not, 
everyone's lives are regulated by the unwritten constitution 
that is based in the human brain. Many of the innate reg­
ulators and predispositions make up the core of this unwritten 
constitution. As introduced by Llewellyn, the "living”
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constitution goes above and beyond any written document, and 
encompasses both the implicit and explicit rules that govern 
any society. Much of legal behavior and people's ’’sense of 
justice” may be genetically transmitted from generation to 
generation. Predispositions towards altruism, feelings of 
envy, dominance-deference hierarchies, and Internal reward 
systems all establish an unwritten and living constitution. 
Reciprocity especially, a s  a viable system of give-and-take, i s  
at the root of any living constitution.* 7 Furthermore, this 
living constitution is continuously subject to change through 
the process of gene-culture coevolution, as new adaptive 
strategies arise, and old ones become obsolete. If the written 
laws and constitution (the political law as opposed to the 
natural law) coincide with the behavior they are supposed to 
regulate, the legal system will be more effective.
Nevertheless, in today s complex world, third party 
enforcement in the form of political economy and law is 
necessary to a degree. The legal rules that are enforced by 
government are subject to violation by cheaters or egoists in 
order to reap selfish benefits. Furthermore, simulated 
altruism will reap the same benefits as true altruism when the 
cheater is not detected. Therefore, an egoist has incentive to 
try to simulate altruism if this behavior leads to increases in 
consumption through its effect on the behavior of others/1 
The problem seems to be that cheating will go on under any type 
of governmental institution. The legal and political system
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that minimizes the degree of cheating; and more importantly, 
the need to cheat, will have the greatest potential for success 
and greatest viability under natural economy and law.
An individual's sense of justice, what "feels right," may 
actually be catecholamines being released in the brain as an 
internal reward for behaving a certain way.** Therefore, this 
internal reward system may work to induce behavior which is 
part of our living constitution. What humans perceive to be 
legitimate and right, part of the constitution, may be the 
result of endogenous chemicals acting as an opiate. Carmen 
states that, "Humans are programmed, genetically, to match 
internalized notions of constitutional value' with their own 
behavior patterns."70 However, one should not forget that one 
person's hero is another person s murderer. In other words, 
just because a particular behavior is perceived as "right" in 
one culture, does not mean it will be "right" in another 
culture. Even within any one society the appropriate norms to 
follow may be interpreted differently.
The incest taboo provides a good example of a culturally 
forbidden act that has a strong basis in innate predispositions 
against sibling inbreeding. Data from two historical experi­
ments help demonstrate that the incest taboo is more than just 
a culturally forbidden act. In the Israeli kibbutz unrelated 
children grow up together in very close association, almost 
like siblings. Sexual relations and marriage between children 
reared together is not prohibited in any way. However, the
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amount of inbreeding between these children is practically 
non-existent. Similar evidence of the universality of the 
incest taboo comes from the pre-World War II Taiwanese. In 
this case families invited young, unrelated girls into their 
homes to pair for marriage with their sons. However, by the 
time the children became marrying age they had no interest in 
their predetermined partner. Both of these examples provide 
evidence that humans have an innate predisposition not to 
become sexually intimate with other ’family” members, even if 
they are not genetically related. Further evidence can also be 
found in the avoidance of inbreeding among chimpanzees.71 It 
is also quite possible that negative chemical stimulation 
reinforces behavior against incest, just as positive chemical 
stimulation might reinforce behavior towards altruism. The 
almost universally accepted laws and norms against incest are 
just one example of how a law can have a genetic predisposition 
at its base. Sociobiology can provide a better understanding of 
the genetic predispositions and internal mechanisms which are 
at the basis of all written, and unwritten constitutions.
WAR: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
By applying an evolutionary perspective, and taking into 
account man's genetic predispositions in conjunction with the 
pressures of the environment, we can try to understand the
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underlying causes of war, Arthur Joyce suggests that arms 
races are merely a particular form of intergroup competition 
over resources, which began with changes in the environment 
during the Late Pleistocene and Early Holocene. The escalating 
competition is manifested in overt aggression, leading to 
violent confrontations and warfare between social groups.72 
People are only engaged in cooperative behavior to form groups, 
as a more adaptive strategy to compete for the same resources. 
Intergroup competition leading to warfare is not limited to 
today's industrial society, but has been common in a wide range 
of societies throughout history. However, the type of warfare 
and competition varies depending on the ecological conditions 
and stage of development of a particular society.
Innate predispositions towards aggression and territor­
iality are very relevant to modern warfare It is a c< mbi- 
natlon of innate predispositions, and such cultural develop­
ments as advanced military technology, patriotism, and nationa­
lism that has led to different forms of warfare. Whether a 
group will engage in warfare or not may depend on the relative 
costs and benefits of such behavior in terms of inclusive 
fitness. It would seem logical that one would only enter into 
"high cost" warfare when overriding issues of survival are 
involved. Likewise, as the perceived costs of such behavior 
decrease one might expect other reasons besides survival 
imperatives to come into play.74 For example, a revolution 
might occur if a class of people perceives the costs of bei..g
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exploited as greater than the costa of rebellion.However, 
it should also be remembered that what two people or groups 
define as a survival Imperative may be very different. In this 
sense, one may want to take into account the internal reward 
systems that cause an individual to feel he is behaving in the 
’right" manner. It is the interaction of collective aggres­
sion, and cultural norms, manifested in warfare which appears 
to simply be a coping strategy for dealing with the problem of 
survival and reproduction.
Today's manifestation of escalatory intergroup competition 
is the nuclear arms race. The nuclear arms race is no dif­
ferent from past arms races except for two Important points. 
One is that nuclear war threatens the survival of the entire 
human species. The other is that the nucleai arms race offers 
a deterrent against warfare, due to the fact that there will be 
no winner if the result of a nuclear confrontation is to 
destroy the earth. However, the same evolutionary forces that 
come into play in conventional arms races are also relevant in 
the nuclear arms race.7* Nevertheless, where other forms of 
warfare may have worked to maximize the inclusive fitness of 
some individuals involved; nuclear warfare promises the 
potential of maximization for no one, and destruction for all.
This discussion is not meant to imply that wars are 
unavoidable, necessary, or desirable. An evolutionary perspec­
tive is merely trying to understand how war can be perceived as 
an evolutionary adaptive strategy that a group may feel is
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vital for survival. War should be viewed as the interaction of 
man's innate predispositions and his relationship with the 
surrounding environment and culture. Sociobiology can lead to 
a more complete understanding of this interaction; and hope­
fully* ways to direct this interaction so as to avoid wars. 
Society could work to eliminate those conditions which result 
in violent confrontations between groups. But first society 
has to know what these conditions are, and understand the basis 
from which they stem. Sociobiology on its own will not Lead to 
the prevention of war; but without a complete understanding of 
human behavior, the solutions to conventional war and the 
nuclear arms race will not be found.
CONCLUSION
My intentions in this paper are not to claim sociobiology 
as the great panacea that will solve the world's problems. 
Rather, I wish to draw attention to the importance of combining 
knowledge from sociobiology with other disciplines, and the 
attractions of an evolutionary and biological perspective. A 
sooiobiological paradigm has much to contribute to the social
sciences and our understanding of behavior. One can better
understand how and why different adaptive strategies arise, and 
why people act the way they do.
However, a note of caution is in order. The purpose of
sociobiology is to help provide the solutions to present day 
problems, and answer questions about the nature of man.
However, we may not even yet know the right questions to ask. 
Further research is needed that can be used for the betterment 
of society. But such knowledge always carries the potential to 
be used for the wrong purposes. The object of sociobiology is 
not to control the political and social beliefs of a group of 
people, or manipulate man's genetic make-up for the selfi a 
desires of any particular elite. Eugenics, psychopharmac^logy, 
and mind controlling drugs are all techniques that society 
should guard against in promoting the proper use of socio­
biology. Sociobiology is also being misused if it serves as
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the intellectual basis for racism, sexism, fascism, or any kind 
of ’biological determinism" or "social Darwinism."
The danger that comes with knowledge from sociobiology is 
great, but not ac great as the danger that comes without this 
knowledge. Sociobiology does not provide a method for bio­
logical determinism, but a path towards greater freedom. The 
policy decisions that effect each one of our lives should be 
made on the basis of the most knowledge one can acquire, and 
not from a standpoint of ignorance. As Richard Alexander put 
it, "Essentially everyone thinks of himself as well-meaning, 
but from my viewpoint a society of well-meaning people who 
understand themselves and their history very well is a better 
milieu than a society of well-meaning people who do not." More 
biopolitical research is needed to reap the benefits a socio- 
biological perspective can offer.
Man's preferences are not arbitrary, but have certain 
permanent characteristics which came about through the evolu­
tionary adaptive process. Man as a rational animal can try to 
choose between and oppose different adaptive strategies; 
however, their is always a genetic basis that plays a role in 
these decisions to a certain degree. By using sociobiology and 
applying a biological perspective we can hope to gain further 
understanding of our anciently evolved emotions. Only with 
greater knowledge will we be able to determine the most 
appropriate form of government that will be in concert with
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man's evolved adaptive strategies. Through this understanding 
we can make more realistic calculations of the moral costs and 
benefits of such knowledge and their embodiment in economic and 
political public policy.’*
ENDNOTES
'Roger D. Masters, "Evolutionary biology, political theory 
and the state," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 
5(1982), p. 439. ......
I Fred Kort, "An evolutionary-neurobiological explanation of 
political behavior and the Lumsden-Wilson thousand-year 
rule'," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 6(1983),
p. 220.
5 Roger D. Masters, "The Biological Nature of the State," 
World Politics (Princeton University, 1983), p.193
4 Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology? The Abridged JEdition 
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 4.
* Hiram Caton, "Domesticating Nature: Thoughts on the
Ethology of Modern Politics," in Sociobiology and Human 
Politics, ed. Elliot White, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1981), p. 114.
4 Richard D. Alexander, "Biology and the Moral Paradoxes," 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5(1982), p. 395.
’Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology:__T h e N e w  Syntheses
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 67.
"Gary S. Becker, The__Economic Approach to Human Behavior
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976^, p. 283.
4 Jack Hirshleifer, "Natural Economy versus Political 
Economy,” Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 1(1978), 
p. 319.
1°Hlrshleifer, "Natural Economy versus Political Economy," 
p. 322.
II Karl N. Llewellyn, "The Constitution as an Institution," 
Columbia Law Review. 34(1934), p. 2.
11 Jack Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economic and 
Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies," Journal of
Research in Law and Economics, 4(1982), p . 93.
13 Peter A. Corning, "Toward Survival Oriented Policy 
Science," in Biologyand Politics, ed. Albert Somit, (The 
Hague: Mouton, 1976), p. I45.
55
56
l4Corning, "Toward Survival Oriented Policy Science,” p.
14 Albert Somit, "Review article: Biopolitics," in Biology
and Politics, ed. Albert Somit, (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), p.
298.
14 Ira H. Carman, "Bioconstitutional Politics: Toward an
Interdisciplinary Paradigm," Politics_jind the Life Sciences, 
5(1987), p. 201.
17 Somit, p. 298.
1 •Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: 
Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies," pp. 49-50
l4ArmenA. Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic 
Theory," The Journal of Political Economy, 58(1950), p . 211.
*0 R. Wintrobe (1978), University of Western Ontario, mimeo.
* 1Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: 
Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies," pp. 50-54.
laH, E. Trech, III, "Altruism, Malice, and Public Goods: 
Does Altruism Pay?", Journal of..Soc.ia 1.._and_ B io 1 o.gical_Struc- 
turee, 1(1978), p. 185.
a5 Wilson, "Sociobiology: The New Synthesis," p. 117.
1 4 Kort, pp. 223-224.
1‘William Irons, "Natural Selection, Adaptation, and Human 
Behavior." in EvolutionaryBiology and Human Social Behavior, 
eds. Napoleon A. Chagnon and William irons, (North Scituate, 
MA: Duxbury Press, 1979), p. 23.
14 Irons, pp. 25-26.
1 7 Kort, p.26.
111 Becker, p. 291.
14 Becker, p. 288.
50Masters, "The Biological Nature of the State,” p. 165.
*1 Robert Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," 
Quarterly R«vl«w of Blolpqy. 4(1971), pp. 35-57.
143.
57
3’Masters, "The Biological Nature of the State,” pp. 166-
33 Masters, "Evolutionary biology, political theory, and the 
state," p. 441.
34Masters, "Evolutionary biology, political theory, and the 
state," p. 442.
34 Robert Trivers, "Sociobiology and Politics," in Socio- 
biology and Human Politics, ed. Elliot White, (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 12-15.
3 * Robert Axlerod and William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of 
Cooperation," Science, 211(1981), p. 1395
3 7 Somit, pp.299-300.
3,1 Peter A. Corning, "An Evolutionary Paradigm for the Study 
of Human Aggression," in War, Its Causes and Correlates, eds. 
R. Dale Givens, Anderson Nettleship, and Martin A. Nettleship, 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1975), p. 361.
3 4 Corning, "An Evolutionary Paradigm for the Study of Human 
Aggression," pp. 364-366.
40William Etkin, "A Biological Critique of Sociological 
Theory," in Sociobioloqy and Human Politics, ed. Elliot White, 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 198ll, p. 58.
'‘Corning, "An Evolutionary Paradigm for the Study of Human 
Aggression," p. 369.
41 Paul D. MacLean, "A triangular brief on the evolution of 
brain and law," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 
5(1982), pp. 369-371.
43 Carmen, p. 169.
44Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," p. 49.
4,FredH. Willhoite, Jr., "Rank and Reciprocity: Specula­
tions on Human Emotions and Political Life," in Sociobioloqy 
and Human Politics, ed. Elliot White, (Lexington, MA: Lexing­
ton Books, 1981), p. 245-248.
4 4 Joseph Lopreato, Human Nature and Biocultural Evolution,
(Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 170-173.
167.
47Kort, pp. 221-222.
58
“ Somit, pp. 301-302.
“ MacLean, pp. 374-375.
*°Lopreato, p. 120.
(’Lopreato, p. 122.
“ Bartley G. Hoebal, "The neural and chemical basis of 
reward: new discoveries and theories in brain control of
feeding, mating, aggression, self stimulation, and self­
injection," Journal __of__Social and _ Biological .Structure*,
5(1982), pp. 397-404.
'1Hoebel, p. 408.
*4 James F. Danielli, "Altruism and the Internal Reward 
System or The Opium of the People," Journal of Social and 
Biological Structures. 3(1980), pp. 87-88.
“ Hoebel, pp. 403-404.
“ Margaret Gruter, "Biologically based behavioral research 
and the facts of law," Journal_of Social and Biological 
Structures. 5(1982), p.317.
•’Gruter, "Biologically based behavioral research and the 
facts of law," p. 323.
“ Mordecai Kurz, "Altruism as an outcome of Social Interac­
tion," Technical Report for the Institute for Mathematical 
Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, (Stanford, 
California, Feb. 1978), pp. 4-5.
“ Lopreato, p. 69.
“ Lopreato, pp. 70-76.
•1 Becker, Chapter 7.
•‘Charles J. Lumsden, and Edward 0. Wilson, "Precis of
Genes. Mind, and Culture." Behavior and Brain Sciences, 
5(1982), p. 2.
•‘Charles J. Lumsden, and Edward 0. Wilson. "Precis of
Genes. Mind, and Culture." pp. 1-2.
“ Somit, p. 317.
• •Willhoite, p. 255.
59
6•Hirshleifer, "Natural Economy versus Political Economy," 
p. 333.
•7 Carmen, p. 202.
••Becker, p. 288.
•’Margaret Gruter, "The origins of legal behavior," Journal 
of Social and Biological Structures. 5(1982), pp. 49-50.
70Carmen, pp. 198-199.
7'Carmen, p. 200.
71 Arthur A. Joyce, "The Nuclear Arms Race: An Evolutionary 
Perspective," Chicago, 1987, (Paper presented at the 1987 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association), pp. 10- 1 1 .
7 * Roger D. Masters, "The Impact of Ethology on Political 
Science," in Biology and Politics, ed. Albert Somit, (The 
Hague: Mouton, 1976), p. 208.
7’Corning, "An Evolutionary Paradigm for the study of Human 
Aggression," p. 375.
7’Joyce, p. 54.
’•Joyce, pp. 33-34.
77 Alexander, "Biology and the Moral Paradoxes." p. 395.
7•Wlllhoite, p. 256.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alchian, Armen A. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic 
Theory." The Journal of Political Economy, 58(1950), pp. 211 - 2 2 1 .
Alexander, Richard D. "Biology and the Moral Paradoxes." 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5(1982), pp. 
389-395.
Darwinism and Human Affairs. Seattle. WA:
University of Washington Press, 1979.
Axlerod, Robert and William D. Hamilton. "The Evolution of 
Cooperation." Science. 211(1981), pp. 1390-1396.
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of_Cooperation. New York:
Basic Books, 1984.
Becker, Gary S. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. 
Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Bertsch, Gary K., Robert P. Clark, and David M. Wood. Compar­
ing Political Systems: Power a nd Policy in Three Worlds. 
3rd ed. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1986.
Bigelow, Robert. "The Role of Competition and Cooperation in 
Human Evolution." In War, Its Causes a n d Correlates. Eds. 
R. Dale Givens, Anderson Nettleship, and Martin A. Nettle- 
ship. The Hague: Mouton, 1975.
Caldwell, Lynton K. "Biopolitics: Science, Ethics and public
Policy." Yale Review. 54(Oct 1964), pp. 1-16.
Carmen, Ira H. "Bioconstitutional Politics: Toward an
Interdisciplinary Paradigm." Politics and the Life Scien­
ces, 5(1987), pp. 193-219.
Caton, Hiram. "Domesticating Nature: Thoughts on the Ethology
of Modern Politics." In Socloblology and Human Politics. 
Ed. Elliot White. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981.
Chagnon, Napoleon A., and William Irons. Evolutionary Biology 
and Human Social Behavior. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury
Press, 1979.
Corning, Peter A. "An Evolutionary Paradigm for the Study of 
Human Aggression." In War, Its Causes and Correlates.
Eds. R. Dale Givens, Anderson Nettleship, and Martin A. 
Nettleship. The Hague: Mouton, 1975.
60
61
"Toward a Survival Oriented Policy Science." In 
Biology and Politics. Ed. Albert Somit. The Hague: 
Mouton, 1976.
Danielli, James F. "Altruism and the Internal Reward System or 
The Opium of the People." Journal of Social and Biological 
Structures. 3(1980), pp. 07-94.
Davies, James Chowning. "The Proper Biological Study of 
Politics." Political Psychology, 4(1983), pp. 731-743.
Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic. Theory of.Democracy. New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957.
Etkin, William. "A Biological Critique of Sociological 
Theory." In Sociobiology and Human Politics. Ed. Elliot 
White. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981.
Freeh, H.E. III. "Altruism, Malice and Public Goods: Does
Altruism Pay?" Journal of Social and Biological Struc­
tures, 1(1978), pp. 181-185.
Furike, Odelia. "Biopolitics and Public Policy: Controlling
Biotechnology." PS, 18(1985), pp. 69-77,
Givens, R. Dale. "Aggression in Nonhuman Primates: Implica­
tions for Understanding Human Behavior." In War, Its 
Causes and Correlates. Eds. R. Dale Givens, Anderson 
Nettleship, and Martin A. Nettleship. The Hague: Mouton,
1975.
Gruter, Margaret. "Biologically based behavioral research and 
the facts of law." Journal of Social and Biological^ Struc­
tures, 5(1982), pp. 315-323.
"The origins of legal behavior." Journal of 
Social and Biological Structures, 2(1979), pp. 43-51.
Hamilton, W.D. "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior,
I." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1964), pp 1-16.
Hill, J. "Human altruism and sociocultural fitness." Journal 
of Social and Biological Structures. 7(1984), pp. 17-35.
Hirshleifer, Jack. "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law:
Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies." Journal_of
R « w r c h  in U w  and Economlcg. 4(1982).
62
"Natural Economy Versus Political Economy." 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 1(1978), pp. 
319-337.
Hoebel, Bartley G. "The neural and chemical basis of reward: 
new discoveries and theories in brain control of feeding, 
mating, aggression, self-stimulation and self-injection." 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5(1982), pp. 
397-408.
Irons, William. "Natural Selection, Adaptation, and Human
Behavior. " In Evolutionary __Bioloay jand Human Socia 1
Behavior. Eds. Napoleon A. Chagnon and William Irons. 
North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1979.
Joyce, Arthur A. "The Nuclear Arms Race: An Evolutionary
Perspective." Chicago, 1987. (Paper presented at the 1987 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association.)
Kort, Fred. "An evoli.tionary-neurobiological explanation of 
political behavior and the Lumsden-WiIson thousand-year 
rule." Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 
6(1983), pp. 219-230.
Kurz, Mordecai. "Altruism as an outcome cf Social Interac­
tion. "
Technical Report for the Institute for Mathematical Studies 
in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. Stanford, 
California, Feb. 1978.
Llewellyn, Karl N. "The Constitution as an Institution." 
Columbia Law Review, 34(1934), pp. 1-40.
Lopreato, Joseph. Human_Nature and ^JBipcultural...EyoJLutipn.
Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984.
Lumsden, Charles J., and Edward 0. Wilson. "Precis of Genes.
Mind, rnd Culture." Behavior and_Brain Sciences, 5(1982),
pp. 1-7.
Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origin of
Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
MacLean, Paul D. "A triangular brief on the evolution of brain 
and law." Journal of Social and Bloloqlca1 structures, 
5(1982), pp. 369-379.
Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts New
York: International Publishers, 1964.
63
Masters, Roger D. "Evolutionary biology, political theory and 
the state." Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 
5(1982), pp. 439-450.
"The Biological Nature of the State." World 
Politics. 35(1983), pp. 161-193.
"The Impact of Ethology on Political Science." 
In Biology and Politics. Ed. Albert Somit. The Hague: 
Mouton, 1976.
Schubert, Glendon. "Politics as a Life Science: How and Why
the Impact of Modern Biology Will Revolutionize the Study 
of Political Behavior." In Biolo g y and Politics. Ed. 
Albert Somit. The Hague: Mouton, 1976.
Somit, Albert. "Review article: Biopolitics." In Biology and 
Politics. Ed. Albert Somit. The Hague: Mouton, 1976.
Trech, H. E. III. "Altruism, Malice, and Public Goods: Does
Altruism Pay?" Journal of Social and Biological Struc­
tures, 1(1978), p. 185. ....
Trivers, Robert. "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism." 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 4(1971), pp. 35-57.
"Sociobiology and Politics." In Sociobiology 
and Human Politics. Ed. Elliot White. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1981.
Tullock, Gordon. "Altruism, Malice, and Public Goods."
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 1(1978), pp. 
3-9.
"Altruism, Malice, and Public Goods: A Reply to
Trech." Journal__of. Social _and Bio_logical Structures,
1(1978), pp. 187-189.
Willhoite, Fred H. Jr. "Rank and Reciprocity: Speculations on 
Human Emotions and Political Life." In Sociobiology and 
Human Politics. Ed. Elliott White. Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1981.
Wilson, Edward 0. Sociobioloqy: The Abridged Edition.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Sociobioloqy: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1975.
Wlntrobe, R. (1978), University of Western Ontario, mimeo.
